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ARIZONA AND ANTI-REFORM
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos*

The Supreme Court is on the cusp of rejecting one of the best ideas for reforming
American elections: independent commissions for congressional redistricting. According to the
plaintiffs in a pending case, a commission is not “the Legislature” of a state. And under the
Elections Clause, it is only “the Legislature” that may set congressional district boundaries.
There are good reasons, grounded in text and precedent, for the Court to rebuff this
challenge. And these reasons are being aired effectively in the case’s briefing. In this symposium
contribution, then, I develop three other kinds of arguments for redistricting commissions.
Together, they illuminate the high theoretical, empirical, and policy stakes of this debate.
First, commissions are supported by the political process theory that underlies many
Court decisions. Process theory contends that judicial intervention is most justified when the
political process has broken down in some way. Gerrymandering, of course, is a quintessential
case of democratic breakdown. The Court itself thus could (and should) begin policing
gerrymanders. And the Court should welcome the transfer of redistricting authority from the
elected branches to commissions. Then the risk of breakdown declines without the Court even
needing to enter this particular thicket.
Second, commission usage leads to demonstrable improvements in key democratic
values. The existing literature links commissions to greater partisan fairness, higher
competitiveness, and better representation. And in a rigorous new study, spanning federal and
state elections over the last forty years, I find that commissions, courts, and divided governments
all increase partisan fairness relative to unified governments. At the federal level, in particular,
commissions increase partisan fairness by up to fifty percent.
And third, the implications of the plaintiffs’ position are more sweeping than even they
may realize. If only “the Legislature” may draw congressional district lines, then governors
should not be able to veto plans, nor should state courts be able to assess their legality. And
beyond redistricting, intrusions into any other aspect of federal elections by governors, courts,
agencies, or voters should be invalid as well. In short, a victory for the plaintiffs could amount to
an unnecessary election law revolution.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem of gerrymandering is not ultimately a hard one. Just take away the
legislature’s power to design districts, and transfer it to a properly designed commission. Then
self-interest is removed from the line drawing, and the commission can set boundaries based on
criteria that are not (intentionally) biased in any party or candidate’s favor.1 This reasoning
explains why thirteen states have switched to commission control over redistricting—including,
most recently, behemoths like California and New York.2 It also explains why just about every
foreign country that uses single-member districts has entrusted their crafting to a commission.3
The Supreme Court, though, has agreed to hear a case that may turn this logic on its
head. The case, Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,4
stems from Arizona voters’ decision, in a 2000 initiative, to establish a commission with final
say over redistricting.5 The Arizona legislature now claims that the commission is
unconstitutional under the Elections Clause. This provision states that “[t]he Times, Places and
Manner” of federal elections “shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”6 The
commission, obviously enough, is not the legislature. Thus, the argument goes, the commission’s
power over redistricting violates the Constitution’s exclusive grant of electoral authority to the
legislature.
There are good textual and precedential reasons to reject this challenge. As a textual
matter, a phrase as procedural as “Times, Places and Manner” may not cover an activity as
substantive as redistricting.7 The Clause also may use “Legislature” as shorthand for a state’s
entire lawmaking process, including whatever institutions are specified by the state’s

1

For a fully developed argument in favor of redistricting commissions, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 769, 795-806 (2013).
2
See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., REDISTRICTING LAW 2010, at 187-88 (2009) [hereinafter NCSL
REPORT]. Since the publication of this report, New York also has switched to commission control. See New York
State Unofficial Election Night Results, N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELEC. (Nov. 13, 2014),
http://nyenr.elections.state.ny.us/home.aspx (showing victory of Proposition 1 in statewide vote).
3
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 1, at 780-86 (describing institutions used in redistricting abroad).
4
The lower court’s decision is at 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Ariz. 2014).
5
See id. at 1048-49.
6
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).
7
Id.
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constitution.8 And as a matter of precedent, the Supreme Court twice has allowed entities other
than the legislature to play a role in congressional redistricting. In 1916, the Court upheld an
Ohio referendum in which voters turned down a district plan passed by the legislature.9 And in
1932, the Court validated a Minnesota governor’s veto of a legislatively enacted plan.10
In this Article, though, I do not stress text and precedent—considerations at the heart of
the case’s briefing. Instead, my focus is on the theoretical and empirical arguments for
redistricting commissions. These arguments often are overlooked by lawyers (and judges) more
comfortable with conventional modes of constitutional reasoning. But, in my view, they are
essential to the legal case for commissions. They explain why commissions should be valued in a
democracy, and also what their benefits actually are.
The theoretical foundation for commissions is political process theory. Originating in
Carolene Products’s famous fourth footnote,11 and finding its most influential exposition in the
work of John Hart Ely,12 it contends that courts should strike down laws only when the political
process has broken down in some way. Gerrymandering, of course, is a quintessential example
of democratic breakdown. When politicians gerrymander, they pursue their own advantage rather
than the public interest, and they distort the conversion of public opinion into legislative power.
Courts thus would be entitled to review district plans rigorously to ensure that they are not
gerrymanders.13 But it is even better, from the theory’s perspective, if commissions enact the
plans in the first place. Then the risk of gerrymandering is eliminated ex ante rather than policed
ex post. And courts are able to avoid the difficult (and politically fraught) question of whether
gerrymandering in fact has occurred.
Conversely, it would amount to a wholesale repudiation of process theory if the Court
were to rule in favor of the Arizona legislature. It would mean that the body that can be trusted
least to redistrict fairly is the only body that can be responsible for the activity. It would mean
that the fox must be returned to the henhouse even after voters have chosen to kick it out.
Process theory, it is true, is only one of several interpretive approaches that guide the Court’s
constitutional decisions. But it is hard to see what would be left of it if the Arizona legislature
were to prevail here.
Shifting from theory to empirics, the existing literature has reached largely (though not
entirely) positive conclusions about commissions’ implications for key democratic values.
Partisan fairness is higher in states that use commissions—and even higher in foreign countries
whose commissions are more insulated and technocratic. Competitiveness follows the same
pattern, rising as jurisdictions adopt better designed commissions. And representation, in the
8

Id.
See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569-70 (1916).
10
See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-69 (1932).
11
See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
12
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
13
In earlier work, I have proposed tests that courts could use to review district plans. See Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 40-50) (proposing test based on magnitude of plan’s efficiency gap); Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1428-42 (2012) (proposing
test based on districts’ congruence with geographic communities).
9
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sense of congruence with the preferences of the median voter, is better in states possessing
commissions than in states lacking them.
Unfortunately, none of the existing studies of partisan fairness have controlled
sufficiently for state-specific factors and time trends, or considered enough elections and
electoral levels. I therefore carry out a new empirical analysis of how commission usage is
related to the efficiency gap, a measure of partisan gerrymandering that I have introduced in
previous work with Eric McGhee.14 This analysis covers elections over the entire modern
redistricting era (1972 to 2012), at both the congressional and state house levels. It also considers
the full range of institutions that may be responsible for redistricting: commissions, courts, and
divided or unified state governments. And it includes fixed effects for states and years, giving
rise to a full difference-in-differences design that allows judgments about causality to be made.
I find, first, that commissions have not helped much at the state house level. While
commission-drawn plans feature lower efficiency gaps than plans drawn by other actors, these
benefits evaporate once controls for states and years are added. However, plans enacted by
courts, which also are appealing bodies from a process theory standpoint, are linked to a
statistically significant improvement in partisan fairness. So too are plans passed by divided state
governments, which have no incentive to try to favor a particular party.
At the congressional level, my results vary somewhat based on whether I calculate plans’
efficiency gaps using congressional or presidential election results. Using congressional data, the
presence of divided government improves partisan fairness, and neither commission nor court
usage attains statistical significance. But using presidential data (which, arguably, is better suited
to the task), the presence of divided government again improves partisan fairness, and
commission usage is tied to a statistically significant and substantively large reduction in the
efficiency gap. Specifically, it produces a 6% reduction, which represents about half of the 12%
gap of the median plan.
These findings bolster the case for congressional redistricting commissions (the only kind
at issue in the pending litigation). Not only does process theory predict that these commissions
should be less prone to gerrymandering than legislatures, but its prediction is borne out by a
thorough empirical examination. But what happens if the Court ignores these arguments? If the
Arizona legislature wins, what then?
An obvious consequence is that all commissions with responsibility for congressional
redistricting may be unconstitutional. Such commissions now exist in eleven states, and all of
them may have to be discarded since they are non-legislative bodies with authority over federal
elections. But this is just the beginning of the potential ramifications. If only the legislature may
be involved in redistricting, then it may be impermissible for a governor to veto a legislative
plan, or for a state court to assess its validity. Governors and state courts also may need to be
excluded from all other aspects of federal elections: franchise access, party primaries, campaign
finance, minority representation, and so on. Voter initiatives that touch on these areas may be
unlawful as well. If the Elections Clause really means that the legislature is the only state actor
that may regulate federal elections, much of modern election law may be void.
14

See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 13 (manuscript at 14-28).
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On the other hand, commissions responsible for state legislative redistricting would be
unscathed by an adverse decision. The Clause applies only to federal elections, and so is
irrelevant to how states choose to design districts for their own legislatures. In addition,
Congress would remain free to authorize (or even compel) the use of commissions for
congressional redistricting. The Clause’s second half states that Congress “may at any time by
law make or alter such regulations.”15 Congress could invoke this power to mandate
commissions, or to adjust any other aspect of federal elections. Indeed, an adverse decision
might boost the odds of federal intervention by frustrating the states’ own efforts at
experimentation. If reform can come only from Washington, pressure might build for
Washington to act.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I briefly summarize the Arizona case and the
key arguments from text and precedent. In Part II, I explain why process theory supports
commissions and opposes redistricting by legislatures. In Part III, I describe the existing
literature on commissions’ implications for partisan fairness, competitiveness, and
representation. In Part IV, I conduct my own empirical analysis of commissions’ impact on the
size of the efficiency gap. And in Part V, I comment on what developments may follow from a
decision by the Court in favor of the Arizona legislature.
I. THE ARIZONA CASE
For almost a century after statehood, Arizona redrew its state legislative and
congressional districts like most states. The legislature passed ordinary statutes, and the governor
then signed them into law. In 2000, though, Arizona voters approved Proposition 106 by a
margin of 56% to 44%.16 Proposition 106 withdrew the elected branches’ authority over
redistricting, and transferred it to an independent commission.17
The commission is staffed as follows: First, a different commission responsible for
appellate court appointments selects a pool of twenty-five candidates, including ten from each
major party and five independents.18 Second, the majority and minority leaders of the Arizona
House and Senate each appoint one commissioner.19 And third, these four commissioners choose
an independent from the pool to serve as the body’s chair and tie-breaking vote.20 The
commission then crafts districts based on the following criteria: (1) compliance with federal law;
(2) equal population; (3) compactness and contiguity; (4) respect for communities of interest; (5)

15

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4.
See State of Arizona Official Canvass, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (Nov. 7, 2000),
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2000/General/Canvass2000GE.pdf. For a discussion of why Proposition 106
succeeded, while most redistricting initiatives fail, see Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why
Popular Initiatives to Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 368-71 (2007).
17
See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2 § 1(3) (“[A]n independent redistricting commission shall be established to
provide for the redistricting of congressional and state legislative districts.”).
18
See id. § 1(5).
19
See id. § 1(6).
20
See id. § 1(8) (also noting that if commissioners cannot agree on a chair, she will be selected by
commission on appellate court appointments).
16
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respect for political subdivisions; and (6) competitiveness.21 The commission’s plans go into
force without the need for any further action by the elected branches.22
In the 2000 cycle, the commission’s maps generated a substantial volume of litigation.23
But none of these lawsuits, which spanned issues from equal population to the Voting Rights Act
to the competitiveness criterion, alleged that the commission itself was unconstitutional.24 This
claim was not made until the current cycle, during which the displeasure of the Republicandominated state government with the commission’s work reached new heights. The main
objection of Republican leaders is that the commission’s congressional map is not as favorable to
Republican candidates as it could be.25 The map features four heavily Republican districts, two
heavily Democratic districts, and three highly competitive districts. Democrats won the three
tossup districts in 2012, giving them a five-to-four advantage despite receiving fewer votes
statewide.26
Republican legislators first struck at the commission by voting to oust its chair for “gross
misconduct.”27 However, this maneuver was thwarted by the Arizona Supreme Court, which
held that a valid basis for removing the chair did not exist.28 On a party line vote, Republicans
next decided to challenge the commission’s constitutionality.29 The lawsuit they authorized was
dismissed by a three-judge district court,30 but now is slated for argument before the U.S.
Supreme Court.31
The legislature’s position, as detailed in its brief to the Court, is straightforward. In its
view, the Elections Clause delegates power over congressional elections to it, and to it alone.32
“Legislature” unambiguously means the state’s representative lawmaking body, and does not
21

See id. § 1(14).
See id. § 1(17).
23
See, e.g., Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redist. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm’n, 366 F. Supp. 2d 887 (D.
Ariz. 2005); Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998 (D. Ariz. 2002); Ariz. Minority
Coal. for Fair Redist. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676 (Ariz. 2009) (en banc).
24
See id.
25
See, e.g., District Redrawing Politically Charged, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 13, 2011, at B1 (“Republicans
are distrustful of the commission , and . . . believe the process is rigged to give Democrats the upper hand . . . .”);
New Map May Alter Races for Congress, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 4, 2011, at A1 (“Republicans . . . are concerned that
some of their incumbents generally have gotten a raw deal . . . .”).
26
See Election Adds to Debate Over Redistricting, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 24, 2012, at A1; State of Arizona
Official Canvass, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2012/General/Canvass2012GE.pdf. In 2014, Republicans won a five-to-four majority
after prevailing in a recount in one of the tossup districts. See Arizona’s Vote Count Once Again Hits Snags, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, JAN. 1, 2015, at A1; State of Arizona Official Canvass, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2014/General/Canvass2014GE.pdf.
27
See Redistricting Chief Ousted, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 2, 2011, at A1.
28
See Redistrict Chief Reinstated, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 18, 2011, at A1.
29
See Legislature Challenges Redistrict Commission, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 8, 2012, at B1.
30
See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Ariz. 2014).
31
See Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 46 (2014).
32
See Brief for Appellant at 23-24, Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm’n, No. 13-1314 (U.S.
Dec. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Ariz. Legis. Brief] (“The plain text of this provision clearly delegates the authority . . . to
one entity alone: ‘the Legislature’ of a State . . . .”); Brief for Appellees at 33, Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep.
Redist. Comm’n, No. 13-1314 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (discussing “narrow definition of ‘Legislature’ that Appellant
proposes, namely that the term refers exclusively to a body of elected representatives”).
22
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encompass any other institution or process.33 It thus violates the Clause for a non-legislative
entity like the commission to be involved in redistricting, and for the legislature itself to be
excluded.34 “[W]hile the [commission] is plainly not the Legislature and is structured to look and
operate nothing like the Legislature, the actual Legislature has been cut out of the redistricting
process entirely . . . .”35
One textual response is that “Legislature” reasonably may be read to denote a state’s
lawmaking process in its entirety, including whatever methods are identified by the state’s
constitution. As the district court in the Arizona case put it, “the word ‘Legislature’ in the
Elections Clause refers to the legislative process used in that state, determined by that state’s
own constitution and laws.”36 Under this reading, there was nothing wrong with Proposition
106’s transfer of cartographic power from the legislature to the commission, because voter
initiatives like Proposition 106 are authorized explicitly by the Arizona Constitution.37
Another textual retort is that “Times, Places and Manner” plausibly may be construed as
extending only to procedural issues—and not to an activity with as many substantive
consequences for candidates and parties as redistricting.38 The Court has long interpreted the
Elections Clause as “a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not a source of
power to dictate electoral outcomes.”39 Since the power to shape districts is, above all, the power
to dictate outcomes, it may be impermissible for legislatures to redistrict on the basis of political
considerations. At the very least, under this reading, it would be acceptable for a non-legislative
body to draw district lines based on nonpartisan criteria. Indeed, such a redistricting process
might be affirmatively compelled by the Clause.40
As a matter of precedent as well, a trio of cases have made clear that entities other than
the legislature may play a role in congressional redistricting. In the 1916 case of Ohio ex rel.
Davis v. Hildebrant,41 the Court upheld an Ohio referendum in which voters rejected a district
plan passed by the legislature. It did not matter that voters are distinct from the legislature,
because “the referendum constituted a part of the state Constitution and laws, and was contained
within the legislative power.”42 Similarly, in the 1932 case of Smiley v. Holm,43 the Court
sustained a Minnesota governor’s veto of a legislatively enacted map. Again, the governor’s

33

See Ariz. Legis. Brief, supra note 32, at 24-31.
See id. at 36-42.
35
Id. at 37-38.
36
Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist. Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1054 (D. Ariz. 2014); see also
Brown v. Sec’y of State, 668 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he term ‘Legislature’ in the Elections Clause
refers not just to a state’s legislative body but more broadly to the entire lawmaking process of the state.”).
37
See Ariz. State Legis., 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1054-55 (“The Arizona Constitution allows multiple avenues
for lawmaking and one of those avenues is the ballot initiative, as employed here through Proposition 106.”).
38
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4.
39
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833-34 (1995).
40
For a longer argument along these lines, see Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political
Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 263-67 (2006).
41
241 U.S. 565 (1916).
42
Id. at 567.
43
285 U.S. 355 (1932).
34
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involvement was unobjectionable because it was “in accordance with the method which the state
has prescribed for legislative enactments.”44
In the 2014 case of Brown v. Secretary of State,45 lastly, the Eleventh Circuit validated a
Florida voter initiative that required the legislature to comply with an array of redistricting
criteria. Once more, it was immaterial that an initiative is something other than the legislature,
because “the lawmaking power in Florida expressly includes the power of the people to amend
their constitution, and that is exactly what the people did here.”46 Brown probably is the
precedent most applicable to the Arizona case, since it also concerned a redistricting initiative. If
the Florida amendment did not violate the Elections Clause, it is hard to see how Proposition 106
could do so.
Much more could be said, of course, about the textual and precedential arguments for and
against each side. (And much more has been said in the case’s briefing.) But my interest here is
not in reiterating these relatively conventional points. Instead, I wish to focus on the theoretical
and empirical aspects of the debate—aspects that the briefing mostly has missed. In the next
Part, then, I assess redistricting commissions from the perspective of political process theory. In
short, the theory strongly favors them because they mitigate the high risk of democratic
malfunction associated with legislative redistricting.
II. THE PROCESS THEORY PERSPECTIVE
The core claim of process theory is that courts are most justified in striking down laws
that emerge from a flawed political process. In this context, courts avoid the countermajoritarian
difficulty because their intervention promotes democracy instead of frustrating it. Process theory
has its roots in Carolene Products’s legendary fourth footnote, which identified two kinds of
process defects warranting “more exacting judicial scrutiny.”47 The first is “legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation”—that is, policies making it more likely that the majority’s preferences
will be thwarted.48 The second is “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities,” which may
“curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities.”49
Two generations after Carolene, John Hart Ely refashioned its dicta into perhaps the most
celebrated theory of judicial review of all time. He agreed with the Court that “unblocking
stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be about.”50
He also restated the process defects that justify judicial intervention as follows: “(1) the ins are
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay
out, or (2) . . . representatives . . . are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple
44

Id. at 367.
668 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2014).
46
Id. at 1279.
47
United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
48
Id.
49
Id. For an article-length treatment of the second kind of process defect, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos,
Political Powerlessness (Jan. 1, 2015).
50
ELY, supra note 12, at 117.
45

7

hostility . . . .”51 While not without its critics,52 Ely’s theory is widely viewed as explaining much
of the Court’s activity during the second half of the twentieth century.53 And its appeal remains
undimmed today; as David Strauss has quipped, “If you have a better idea about what courts
should be doing in difficult constitutional cases, let me know.”54
Legislative redistricting is troubling from a process theory standpoint, then, because it
often produces the first kind of process defect.55 It often makes it harder for the majority’s
preferences to be realized, and easier for the ins to benefit at the expense of the outs. How can
lines on a map have such dramatic effects? The answer, of course, is that lines determine how
votes are aggregated, and so which candidate wins or loses in each district. One district
configuration helps (or harms) one set of candidates; another configuration helps (or harms)
another set.56
And why are legislators prone to exploiting the opportunities presented by redistricting?
For the obvious reasons of self-interest and partisan advantage. Legislators want to keep their
jobs, and so want to make their districts safe enough that they face no serious challenge.
Legislators also would like for their party to be as powerful as possible, which entails “packing”
the opposition in a few districts that it wins by overwhelming margins, or “cracking” it across
numerous districts that it narrowly loses.57 When the aim of protecting incumbents takes priority
over other factors, a plan is called a bipartisan gerrymander.58 When the goal of helping one
party (and harming its adversary) predominates, a plan is deemed a partisan gerrymander. Either
way, a democratic malfunction has occurred, since boundaries have been set for the sake of
distorting the translation of voters’ preferences into legislative seats.
This discussion suggests that courts should review legislatively enacted plans rigorously
to ensure that they are not gerrymanders (of either type). After all, gerrymandering is an
archetypal case of a process defect that should be redressed through judicial intervention. This
conclusion is correct, in my view, and it is why I have proposed elsewhere tests that courts could
use to distinguish valid from invalid plans.59

51

Id. at 103.
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
53
See David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1259 (“Carolene
Products was the theory of the Supreme Court of the United States under Earl Warren . . . .”).
54
Id. at 1269.
55
For longer arguments along these lines, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 1, at 795-806, and
Stephanopoulos, supra note 16, at 334-42.
56
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“District lines are rarely neutral phenomena. They
can well determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close
race likely.”).
57
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 13 (manuscript at 14-16) (explaining techniques of packing
and cracking).
58
For more on the harms of bipartisan gerrymanders, see Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and
Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002).
59
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 13 (manuscript at 40-50) (proposing test based on magnitude
of plan’s efficiency gap); Stephanopoulos, supra note 13, at 1428-42 (proposing test based on districts’ congruence
with geographic communities).
52
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But it is even better, from the perspective of process theory, if commissions design maps
in the first place than if courts scrutinize them after the fact. This is so for two reasons. First,
courts are unlikely to catch all (or even most) gerrymanders. Gerrymanders are notoriously
difficult to detect—so difficult, in fact, that courts essentially have turned the cause of action for
partisan gerrymandering into a dead letter.60 Reliance on judicial policing thus means that many
process defects would go uncorrected. In contrast, properly structured commissions prevent the
defects from arising at all. One cause of gerrymandering, legislators’ self-interest, is absent as
long as commissions are staffed by non-legislators. The other cause, partisan advantage, does not
apply either if commissioners are divided evenly between the parties or (even better) are
nonpartisan technocrats. In short, courts can only fix a democratic malfunction ex post, while
commissions can avoid it ex ante.
Second, commission-crafted plans reduce the need for judicial involvement.61 A
perennial worry of process theory is that courts may strike down laws for reasons other than a
process breakdown, such as the imposition of their substantive values.62 This risk is present as
long as courts are the main line of defense against gerrymandering. They may invalidate plans
not because they shield incumbents or benefit a particular party, but rather because they offend
the judicial sensibility in some other way.63 But the danger diminishes if commissions draw
maps that are then reviewed deferentially by courts. In this case, there is less opportunity for
judicial activity unjustified by process theory, because there is less judicial activity to begin with.
A skeptic might respond that commissions are not immune from the forces that render
legislatures vulnerable to process failures.64 Staff a commission with politicians, especially with
more of one party’s stalwarts than the other’s,65 and it will enact a gerrymander as reliably as a
legislature. There is nothing magical about the commission form. This is true enough, but its
implication is not that commissions in fact are undesirable according to process theory. Rather, it
means that care must be taken to structure the bodies so that they do not redistrict on the basis of
improper considerations. And care often is taken. Most American commissions are bipartisan,
with equal representation for each party,66 while most foreign commissions are nonpartisan,
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See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 13 (manuscript at 1-2) (noting that plaintiffs have lost every
partisan gerrymandering challenge in last generation).
61
For a similar argument, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 1, at 797.
62
See ELY, supra note 12, at 73 (fretting about “value imposition” by a Court that has become “a council of
legislative revision”).
63
See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 432–34 (2006) (striking down
district because it combined overly dissimilar Hispanic populations); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 639-58 (1993)
(striking down district because of racial message it allegedly conveyed).
64
See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public
Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 73 (1985); Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Hen
Houses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 674
(2002).
65
Several states do precisely this. See NCSL REPORT, supra note 2, at 189-200 (2009) (describing
unbalanced politician commissions used in Arkansas, Indiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas).
66
See id. (describing bipartisan commissions used in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington).
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manned by geographers, statisticians, and the like.67 Thanks to these staffing choices, many of
the latter bodies enjoy sterling reputations for independence and impartiality. 68
A skeptic also might grumble that the case for commissions is strong in theory, but
uncertain in practice. What is the evidence, the skeptic might ask, that commissions in fact draw
better maps than legislatures? This charge can be answered only with data. In the next Part, then,
I summarize the existing literature on commissions’ effects on partisan fairness, competitiveness,
and representation. And in the following Part, I carry out my own analysis of how commission
usage is related to the size of the efficiency gap. Together, these Parts show that the case for
commissions is empirically persuasive as well. A Court decision in favor of the Arizona
legislature thus would be regrettable from the vantage of not just process theory, but also
substantive outcomes.
III. EXISTING LITERATURE
Beginning with partisan fairness, there are two metrics that political scientists use to
evaluate district plans. The first is partisan bias, that is, the divergence in the share of seats that
each party would win given the same share of the statewide vote.69 For example, if Democrats
would win 45% of the seats with 50% of the vote (in which case Republicans would win 55% of
the seats), then a plan would have a pro-Republican bias of 5%. The second is the efficiency gap,
that is, the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election, divided by the
total number of votes cast.70 Votes are “wasted” if they are cast for a losing candidate, or for a
winning candidate but in excess of what she needed to prevail. So if Democrats wasted 200
votes, Republicans wasted 300 votes, and 1000 votes were cast in an election, then a plan would
have a pro-Democratic gap of 10% ((300-200)/1000).
With respect to American elections, three studies have examined how partisan fairness
varies by the identity of the redistricting authority. First, Bruce Cain and others calculated the
partisan biases of fifty legislative chambers in twenty-six states using the results of the 2002
elections.71 The average bias was 4.0% in states with commissions, compared to 11.7% in states
where legislatures drew the lines.72 Second, Vladimir Kogan and Eric McGhee focused on
California’s experience after it adopted a commission for the 2010 cycle.73 For all three maps
that the commission enacted, partisan bias dropped from about 5% to almost zero.74 And third, in
a study of redistricting criteria covering the 1992-2012 period, I found that commissions reduce
67

See Stephanopoulos, supra note 1, at 780-86 (describing foreign redistricting commissions).
See id. at 802.
69
See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 541, 545 (1994); Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test
for Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 8 (2007).
70
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee supra note 13 (manuscript at 14-18) (explaining computation and key
properties of efficiency gap).
71
See Bruce E. Cain et al., Redistricting and Electoral Competitiveness in State Legislative Elections 12
(Apr 13, 2007).
72
These calculations are on file with the author. See also id. at 13 (finding that bias decreased in all nine
states that used bipartisan commissions in 2000 cycle).
73
See Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of the Citizens
Commission Final Plans, 4 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1 (2012).
74
See id. at 22-24 (presenting seat-vote curves showing these results).
68

10

the efficiency gap in state legislative elections, but have no statistically significant impact in
congressional elections.75 I also found that courts improve partisan fairness in both state
legislative and congressional elections.76
Three more studies have scrutinized the record of foreign commissions. Simon Jackman
determined that two Australian states, South Australia and Queensland, experienced dramatic
drops in partisan bias after instituting commissions, respectively, in 1975 and 1992.77 Similarly,
Alan Siaroff showed that bias in Quebec fell almost in half after the province adopted a
commission in 1972.78 And in my study of redistricting criteria, I found that partisan bias and the
efficiency gap both are about one-third lower in Australian district plans (all of which now are
devised by commissions) than in American maps.79 These foreign analyses confirm the mostly
encouraging picture painted by the more rigorous U.S. work.
Next, political scientists assess competitiveness using several different metrics. Some are
fairly self-explanatory, such as the average margin of victory and the share of districts won by
less than some threshold (typically ten or twenty points).80 But electoral responsiveness may be
less clear; it refers to the rate at which a party gains or loses seats given changes in its statewide
vote share.81 For instance, if Democrats would win 10% more seats if they received 5% more of
the vote, then a plan would have a responsiveness of 2.0.
With respect to the more familiar metrics, Cain et al. found that, in 2002, districts drawn
by commissions were more likely to be contested, and to be decided by less than ten points, than
districts drawn by legislatures.82 Likewise, Jamie Carson and Michael Crespin concluded that
commissions had a positive impact on the share of districts won by less than twenty points in the
1992 and 2002 congressional elections, even controlling for a range of other variables.83 And in
my study of redistricting criteria, I determined that commissions reduced the average margin of
victory and increased the share of districts won by less than twenty points in congressional
elections from 1992 to 2012, again controlling for other relevant factors.84 I also found that
courts improved competitiveness in state legislative elections,85 and that plans enacted by
Australian commissions generally are more competitive than their American analogues.86
75

See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist Criteria, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
669, 710-11 (2013) (also finding that commissions do not significantly affect partisan bias at either level).
76
See id. (showing that courts have statistically significant impact in three of four models).
77
See Simon Jackman, Measuring Electoral Bias: Australia, 1949–93, 24 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 319, 344-45
(1994).
78
See Alan Siaroff, Electoral Bias in Quebec Since 1936, 4 CAN. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 66-67 (2010) (using
slightly different method to calculate bias).
79
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 75, at 704.
80
See id. at 685 (discussing these metrics).
81
See Gelman & King, supra note 69, at 542, 544; Grofman & King, supra note 69, at 9.
82
See Cain et al., supra note 71, at 16.
83
See Jamie L. Carson & Michael H. Crespin, The Effect of State Redistricting Methods on Electoral
Competition in United States House of Representatives Races, 4 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 455, 461-62 (2004).
84
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 75, at 712-15. However, commissions did not have a statistically
significant impact on competitiveness in state legislative elections.
85
See id. However, courts did not have a statistically significant impact on competitiveness in
congressional elections.
86
See id. at 704.
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However, commissions did not have a statistically significant impact on incumbent vote
share in congressional races between 1982 and 2008, according to a study by James Cottrill.87
(Though they did make these races more likely to be contested by experienced challengers.88)
Commissions also may have reduced the probability of state legislative races being won by less
than ten points in 2002, according to a study by Seth Masket and others.89 (Though, again,
commissions were associated with lower rates of uncontested elections from 2000 to 2008.90)
With respect to responsiveness, Cain et al. found that, in 2002, commissions’ plans had
an average score of 1.45, compared to 0.88 for legislatures’ maps.91 Similarly, Jackman
determined that, of the ten Australian plans with the lowest responsiveness scores from 1949 to
1993, eight were in a pair of states (South Australia and Western Australia) that lacked
commissions at the time.92 And in my study of redistricting criteria, I concluded that
commissions improved responsiveness in congressional elections over the 1992-2012 period,
while courts improved responsiveness in state legislative elections.93 I also showed that plans
enacted by Australian commissions are nearly twice as responsive as American maps (about 2.8
versus about 1.5).94
Lastly, Eric McGhee, Steven Rogers, and I recently explored how different electoral
reforms (including commissions) are related to representation.95 We conceived of representation
as the ideological distance between the median voter in a state and the median member of the
state’s legislature.96 We used presidential election results to estimate voters’ ideologies, and roll
call votes to estimate legislators’ ideologies.97 And our analysis spanned the 1992-2012 period
and included fixed effects for states and years.98 We found that commissions are the only
redistricting policy that improves representation.99 In states where commissions draw the lines,
the median voter and the median legislator are significantly more proximate than in other states.
In sum, the existing literature largely validates the predictions of process theory. Just as
the theory would expect, commissions are less likely to produce democratic malfunctions than
87

See James B. Cottrill, The Effects of Non-Legislative Approaches to Redistricting on Competition in
Congressional Elections, 44 POLITY 32, 45 (2012).
88
See id. at 48.
89
See Seth E. Masket et al., The Gerrymanderers Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won’t Affect
Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It, 45 POL. SCI. & POL. 39, 41 (2012).
90
See id. at 42.
91
See Cain et al., supra note 71, at 12. These calculations are on file with the author.
92
See Jackman, supra note 77, at 350.
93
See Stephanopoulos, supra note 75, at 712-15. However, commissions did not have a significant impact
on responsiveness in state legislative elections, and courts did not have a significant impact on responsiveness in
congressional elections. See id.
94
See id. at 704.
95
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos et al., The Realities of Electoral Reform, 68 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015).
96
See id. (manuscript at 22-26).
97
See id. (manuscript at 18-22).
98
See id. (manuscript at 22-26).
99
See id. (manuscript at 44-46). More specifically, commissions improve chamber-level alignment but
worsen it at the district level. As we explain, chamber-level results are more important for redistricting policies that
are intended to have statewide consequences. See id. (manuscript at 57-58).
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legislatures. Their district plans typically treat the major parties more symmetrically, exhibit
higher levels of competitiveness, and improve voters’ actual representation. To be sure, not all of
the studies’ findings are positive, but their overall orientation is indisputable. Gerrymandering
does seem rarer when commissions are responsible for redistricting.
However, the reliability of the existing partisan fairness studies is relatively low. In
contrast to the competitiveness and representation studies, most of them include no controls
whatsoever, and none of them include fixed effects for states and years.100 In addition, even the
most thorough partisan fairness study covers only a twenty-year period, or half of the modern
redistricting era.101 In the next Part, I therefore conduct a new empirical analysis that rectifies
these shortcomings. I examine state and federal elections from 1972 to 2012, employing a full
difference-in-differences design that enables conclusions about causality to be reached.
IV. PARTISAN FAIRNESS ANALYSIS
The dependent variable in each of my models is the absolute value of the efficiency gap. I
examine the efficiency gap rather than partisan bias because, as I have argued elsewhere, the
former metric is conceptually superior to the latter.102 The efficiency gap is calculated using
actual election results, not the outcomes of a hypothetical election in which the parties receive
equal vote shares.103 I also consider the absolute rather than the raw value of the efficiency gap
because I am interested here in the magnitude of gerrymandering, not its orientation.104 And I
compute the efficiency gap using state legislative and congressional election results from 1972 to
2012,105 as well as presidential election results aggregated by congressional district over the
same period.106 The advantage of endogenous (i.e., state legislative and congressional) data is
that it comes from the very chambers whose distortion I am studying. The advantage of
exogenous (i.e., presidential) data is that it is unaffected by candidate quality and the
incumbency advantage—and so is more under the control of the redistricting authority.

100

Only my own previous work includes any controls. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 75, at 709-15.
See id. at 690 n.90, 694 n.106.
102
See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 13 (manuscript at 18-25).
103
See id. (manuscript at 22). There are other problems with partisan bias as well, such as its reliance on the
uniform swing assumption, its inapplicability to uncompetitive elections, and the odd results it sometimes produces.
See id. (manuscript at 22-25).
104
I took the same approach in my earlier studies of redistricting criteria, see Stephanopoulos, supra note
75, at 684-85 (using absolute value of partisan bias and efficiency gap), and of electoral reforms, see
Stephanopoulos et al., supra note 95 (manuscript at 25) (using absolute value of regression residual).
105
State legislative election results have been compiled by Carl Klarner in a database he shared with me.
Congressional election results are available at Election Information: Election Statistics, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/index.aspx (last visited Jan.
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Jacobson’s database includes the aggregated presidential data. Unfortunately, presidential election
results aggregated by state legislative district are unavailable for the majority of the 1972-2012 period.
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For each state-year entry in my database, I coded whether its district plan was drawn by a
commission, a court, or a unified or divided state government.107 I included bipartisan and
nonpartisan commissions in the commission category; but not partisan commissions, advisory
commissions, or backup commissions that were not triggered in a given cycle.108 In the court
category, I included plans that were largely or entirely judicially crafted, but not plans to which
courts made only minor adjustments.109 And I assessed governmental control by determining
which party held the governorship and a majority in each legislative chamber at the time of
redistricting. I also coded as unified control cases where a partisan commission tilted in one
party’s favor was used. These institutions are the key independent variables in the models.
The models include fixed effects for states and years too. These fixed effects mean that
any differences among the states due to politics, economics, demography, culture, and so on are
controlled for, as are any time trends. The coefficient for each institution thus indicates its impact
on the size of the efficiency gap independent of developments in other states as well as the
state’s own prior history. This design capitalizes on the significant geographic and temporal
variation of the redistricting institutions in my database. It most closely approaches the social
scientific ideal of identifying policies’ true causal effects.110
At the state legislative level, as displayed in Figure 1’s first panel, the coefficients for
commission usage, court usage, and divided government all are negative, and those for court
usage and divided government both are statistically significant.111 (The omitted category is
unified government.) Court usage and divided government both result in a decline in the absolute
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By redistricting cycle, my main sources were the following: for the 2010s, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING,
http://redistricting.lls.edu (last visited Jan. 1, 2015), for the 2000s, Action on Redistricting Plans: 2001-07, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Jan. 9, 2008),
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/action2000.htm; for the 1990s, Action on
Redistricting Plans: 1991-99, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Oct. 24, 2003),
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and 1980s Redistricting Case Summaries, MINN. LEGIS. COORDINATING COMM’N,
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commissions because they play no role in redistricting.
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This required me to exercise my judgment in certain cases, especially when legislatively enacted plans
were invalidated but then mostly deferred to by courts.
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For a good discussion (and application) of fixed effects regression, see Eric M. McGhee et al., A
Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 337, 343 (2014).
Fixed effects are more appropriate here than random effects because the relevant clusters (years and states) are “of
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value of the efficiency gap of roughly 1%. This is a fairly substantial effect given that the median
state legislative plan has an absolute efficiency gap of about 4%.
At the congressional level and using congressional election results, as shown in Figure
2’s second panel, the coefficients for commission usage, court usage, and divided government all
are negative, and that for divided government is statistically significant.112 (The omitted category
again is unified government.) Divided government produces a decline in the absolute value of
the efficiency gap of roughly 2%. This too is a considerable effect given that the median
congressional plan has an absolute efficiency gap of about 6% (using congressional data).
Lastly, at the congressional level and using aggregated presidential election results, as
presented in Figure 3’s third panel, the coefficients for commission usage, court usage, and
divided government all are negative, and those for commission usage and divided government
are statistically significant.113 (Unified government once more is the omitted category.) Divided
government causes a decline in the absolute value of the efficiency gap of roughly 3%, while
commission usage causes a decline of roughly 6%. The latter figure represents close to half of
the 12% absolute efficiency gap (using presidential data) of the median congressional plan.
In combination, these results provide strong, though not overwhelming, support for the
predictions of process theory. As the theory would expect, unified governments are by far the
institutions most likely to engage in partisan gerrymandering. In every model, the presence of
divided government is linked to a statistically significant (and reasonably large) decrease in the
absolute value of the efficiency gap. Also as the theory would expect, the record of more neutral
institutions is generally positive. Courts produce a statistically significant drop in the absolute
efficiency gap at the state legislative level, while commissions do the same (but more
dramatically) using presidential data at the congressional level. The coefficients for court usage
and commission usage are negative in every model as well. However, they fail to rise to
statistical significance in several cases, thus rendering the overall picture less than perfectly
clear.
Why are courts more effective at the state legislative than at the congressional level? One
possibility is that, in most states, more redistricting criteria (such as compactness, respect for
political subdivisions, and respect for communities of interest) apply to state legislative than to
congressional districts.114 So courts typically have more substantive guidance when designing
state legislative districts, which may make it easier for them to avoid producing plans that are
skewed in one party’s favor.115 And why are commissions more effective using exogenous rather
than endogenous data? The explanation might be that idiosyncratic factors like the incumbency
advantage and candidate quality—which influence endogenous but not exogenous results—often
112

See id.
See id.
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complicate commissions’ efforts to design fair plans. Plans that look balanced according to the
electorate’s underlying partisanship thus might seem less equitable after particular candidates
have run their particular campaigns. Commissions can take into account underlying partisanship,
but not (at least without great difficulty) candidates’ personal peculiarities.116
But while there are still puzzles for future work to solve, it is clear enough that unified
government increases the likelihood of democratic malfunction, while courts and commissions
reduce it. This is a compelling reason for the Court not to rule in favor of the Arizona legislature.
What happens, though, if the Court does so anyway? What policy consequences would follow
for redistricting specifically and for election law more generally? In the Article’s final Part, I
offer some tentative answers.
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Cf. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 13 (manuscript at 29 n.138, 30 n.146) (discussing use of
endogenous versus exogenous data to calculate efficiency gap).
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FIGURE 1: COEFFICIENT PLOTS FOR EFFICIENCY GAP MODELS
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The most obvious implication of a decision in favor of the Arizona legislature would be
that congressional redistricting commissions in several other states likely would be
unconstitutional too. Such commissions currently are used not only in Arizona but also in
California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, New Jersey, New York, and
Washington.117 All of these bodies would be on thin legal ice if the Arizona commission is struck
down. All of them plainly are not the legislature itself, yet exercise authority with respect to an
aspect of federal elections.
Some of these bodies, though, would be on thinner ice than others. California’s would be
the most clearly unconstitutional, because its members are chosen by lottery rather than by
legislative appointment.118 Legislative leaders are permitted only to veto a number of candidates,
not actually to select any of them.119 In the next group would be the Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
New Jersey, and Washington commissions, all of which have essentially the same structure as
the Arizona commission.120 Major party leaders appoint equal numbers of commissioners, who
then (except in Idaho) choose a tie-breaking chair.121 And the most likely to survive would be the
Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, and New York commissions, all of which retain a larger role for the
legislature. The Connecticut and Indiana bodies are convened only if the legislature fails to enact
a congressional plan.122 Analogously, the Iowa and New York bodies only draft advisory maps
that the legislature then is free to accept, revise, or reject.123
But it is not just commissions that might be unconstitutional if the Arizona legislature
prevails. Its claim that the Elections Clause “delegates [electoral] authority . . . to one entity
alone: ‘the Legislature’ of a State” implies that governors and courts should not be involved in
redistricting either.124 The governor’s power to veto congressional plans, which currently exists
in forty-eight states, thus might be void.125 So might be state courts’ authority to evaluate

See NCSL REPORT, supra note 2, at 197-200. This report does not list California or New York’s
commissions because they were adopted after its publication, or Iowa’s because it must be approved by the state
legislature before taking effect.
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Indep. Redist. Comm’n, No. 13-1314 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2014) (also linking Arizona and California commissions).
Another similarity between the Arizona and California bodies is that they are the only congressional redistricting
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ELEC., http://www.elections.ny.gov/ProposedConsAmendments2.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2015) (describing New
York commission).
124
Ariz. Legis. Brief, supra note 32, at 23-24.
125
The only exceptions are Connecticut and North Carolina, where the governor cannot veto congressional
plans. See Who Draws the Lines?, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php (last visited Jan.
1, 2015).
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congressional maps’ validity (let alone to draw remedial maps in the event of their invalidity).126
It would not be hyperbolic to call these potential developments a second reapportionment
revolution—a sweeping transformation of how congressional redistricting has been conducted
for the past half century.
These developments are only potential ones, though, because it is possible to imagine a
decision that invalidates the Arizona commission but not governors’ and state courts’ functions.
In particular, if the Court were to hold that the Elections Clause bars only the legislature’s
complete exclusion from the redistricting process, then various arrangements that preserve roles
for other institutions might be acceptable.127 Then governors might be able to keep their vetoes,
and state courts their suits, because the legislature still would get to draft plans in the first
instance. This approach has the advantage of reducing institutional disruption and avoiding the
overruling of Hildebrant and Smiley. But it has the disadvantage of inconsistency with the
Arizona legislature’s core textual argument. If the power to redistrict belongs to the legislature
alone, then governors and state courts should not be able to block its plans.
Nor should they be able to intrude into any other aspect of federal elections. Federal
elections, of course, include much more than just redistricting. They also span areas such as
franchise access, party primaries, campaign finance, and minority representation. In all of these
areas too, the implication of the Arizona legislature’s position is that it should wield exclusive
power. Electoral rules are not set by the legislature alone if governors and state courts can negate
its choices, if voters can shape policy via initiative, or if state agencies play a role in
regulation.128 The gubernatorial veto, judicial adjudication, direct democracy, and agency
administration all are forms of lawmaking distinct from the legislature itself. Accordingly, it is
not just a reapportionment revolution that would ensue if the Arizona legislature’s stance is
accepted. The reverberations also would be felt in every other corner of the electoral landscape.
For a sense of how violent these shocks would be, consider the many reforms that have
been adopted through voter initiatives. Over the years, voters have restricted the franchise
through photo identification laws,129 expanded it through right-to-vote amendments,130 required
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parties to hold certain types of primaries,131 imposed term limits on officeholders,132 enacted
variants of the Voting Rights Act,133 and so on. All of these policies have extended to federal
elections—and all of these extensions would be unconstitutional according to the Arizona
legislature. Likewise, take the many state officials and agencies who supervise elections: the
Secretary of State in thirty-nine states,134 as well as more specialized bodies like Wisconsin’s
Government Accountability Board.135 Their ambit also includes federal elections, and so cannot
be reconciled with the Arizona legislature’s claim of exclusive authority in this domain.
Still, it is important not to overstate the consequences of an adverse decision. For one
thing, commissions responsible for state legislative redistricting will be entirely unaffected. The
Elections Clause applies only to “Elections for [United States] Senators and Representatives.”136
It therefore has no bearing on the substantially larger number of commissions that redraw the
maps for states’ own legislative chambers. These bodies exist (in some form) in Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont,
and Washington.137 All of them will be able to continue on their merry way no matter how the
Arizona case is resolved.
The capacity of Congress to regulate federal elections will be left intact as well. The
second half of the Elections Clause states that “Congress may at any time make or alter such
Regulations.”138 This power has been described by the Court as “broad”139 and
“comprehensive,”140 “embrac[ing] authority to provide a complete code for congressional
elections”141 and able to be “exercised at any time, and to any extent which [Congress] deems
expedient.”142 Congress could use the power to refashion federal policy on redistricting (or any
other electoral matter) at its discretion. It could permit (or even mandate) the adoption of
congressional redistricting commissions irrespective of the preferences of state legislatures.
In fact, a victory for the Arizona legislature could increase the odds of aggressive
congressional intervention. At present, most redistricting reform activity occurs in the states,
both because this is where most past successes have arisen and because an array of veto points
131
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typically thwart federal action. But if it became impossible to combat gerrymandering at the state
level, pressure for Congress to address the problem likely would mount. Reformers likely would
shift their efforts from state capitals to Washington, because only Washington would be able to
provide an effective response. Notably, every other country that has adopted redistricting
commissions for its constituent subparts has done so through federal legislation.143 In the long
run, a win for the Arizona legislature might make this outcome more probable in America as
well.
Given all the veto points at the federal level, though, the long run seems long indeed.
Even if the odds of a congressional solution would rise with an adverse decision, they only
would shift from nearly nonexistent to very poor. It thus is impossible to sugarcoat what the
invalidation of the Arizona commission would mean for federal elections. Eventually, things
could turn out all right—but, in the meantime, the institutions that should have the least authority
over electoral issues would see their influence over them grow immeasurably. In the meantime, a
disaster from the perspective of process theory would unfold.144
CONCLUSION
Richard Pildes famously has complained about the “constitutionalization of democratic
politics”—the tendency of courts to invalidate electoral policies for formalist reasons, thus
overly limiting other actors’ discretion in matters of democratic design.145 A decision in favor of
the Arizona legislature would fit this pattern perfectly. An institution that abridges no individual
rights and threatens no democratic values would be rendered unlawful simply because,
semantically, it is something other than a legislature. In fact, it is even worse than that. Not only
does a redistricting commission not abridge rights or threaten values, it affirmatively promotes
one of the most vital goals of all of constitutional law: preventing insiders from enacting laws
that benefit them at the expense of the public at large. One can only hope, then, that the Court
will approach the Arizona case from a standpoint other than mindless literalism. It is bad enough
to strike down policies that cause no great harm. It is even more perverse to ban ones that ought
to be celebrated.
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APPENDIX

VARIABLES

(1)
State Legislative
Plans

(2)
Congressional Plans
(Congressional Data)

(3)
Congressional Plans
(Presidential Data)

-0.00167
(0.00682)
-0.0101**
(0.00497)
-0.00792*
(0.00412)
0.0538***
(0.00250)
Yes
Yes

-0.0102
(0.0153)
-0.00298
(0.00862)
-0.0204**
(0.00942)
0.0779***
(0.00452)
Yes
Yes

-0.0630***
(0.0201)
-0.0144
(0.0114)
-0.0316**
(0.0124)
0.149***
(0.00596)
Yes
Yes

736
0.010

462
0.012

462
0.031

Commission
Court
Divided Government
Constant
State Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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